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FEAR AND LOATHING IN INDOCHINA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN REFUSAL TO SIGN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 1954

On a warm spring morning in 1954, five countries came together to discuss the fate of a
nation. Delegates from the Soviet Union, France, China, the United Kingdom, and the United
States met in a city on the southern edge of Switzerland that would later come to be known as the
"Peace Capital of the World"—Geneva—and attempted to come to a resolution on the ongoing
violence in Indochina. America's refusal to sign the ultimate accords passed at this conference
summed up neatly how the fear of communism radicalized their policies, both globally and in
Vietnam. With this decision, the United States demonstrated not only how alarmed they were by
communist expansion in any sphere, but also just how extreme the measures were that they were
willing to take to curb it, including supporting obviously corrupt and negative leadership and
entering willingly into a twenty-year, $690 billion conflict.1
In theory, the intent of the conference was to resolve the crisis over leadership in
Southeast Asia. Since the early 1940s, control of Vietnam (and to a lesser extent, Cambodia and
Laos) had been contested by the sometimes-at-odds, sometimes-allied colonial forces of France
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and Japan. The conflict was further complicated by the struggle for political control among the
Vietnamese people, which echoed the Cold War ideological divide across the globe. The
interests of the Indochinese nations were supposed to be at the center of the conference's
discussion, but in reality, the debate reflected most strongly the contemporary desires and fears
of the world's most prominent powers.
The French feared losing their territory in Vietnam, but even more fervently worried that
all their military and political efforts in the area over the last century would be for naught. The
Soviet Union, already embroiled deeply and bitterly in the Cold War, supported Ho Chi Minh
but feared what the democratic world powers were willing to do in order to staunch the spread of
communism. Most afraid of all was the United States. They were deeply concerned about the
continuation of the only political movement—communism—which really posed a threat to their
newfound world power. They were also troubled by the idea that a scrappy group of
revolutionaries (the Viet Minh) could really best a standing world power (France) and, as a
result, pose a danger to the new authority of the United States. Vietnam, a nation "without
substantial economic independence, without real experience in political struggle… [and]
insecure and subject to manipulation from various sides”2 awaited a decision from Geneva that
would be made by five immensely powerful but also extremely unsettled leaders who were really
being asked, directly and unavoidably, what system of world power they were choosing to
support.
The events that took place in Geneva in 1954—the provisions put forth in the peace
accords, the positions of the world powers, and the ultimate resolutions of the American
2
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delegation—proved crucial in understanding U.S. action in Vietnam moving forward. In the 21
years following the conference, the world bore witness to "the most divisive and demoralizing
struggle in a century of American history”3 and generally what is considered to be the most
massive military loss in the country's existence.4 The nation of Vietnam, which may have
originally appeared insignificant, actually served as "a microcosm of processes that unfolded
across much of the globe after 1945 as anticolonialism nationalism surged and the great powers,
concerned largely with gaining advantage in the Cold War, struggled to harness it to their
purposes or, failing that, to dampen its challenge.”5 Indochina epitomized the global conflict
between communism and democracy; for that reason, the decision made at the conference
reflected the position that America took on the issue globally and the extremist political
ideologies that were used in Vietnam over the next twenty years.
Therein lies the true importance of the Geneva convention of 1954. Since the end of the
war in 1973, countless historians have attempted to explain the complete and total failure of the
United States' actions in Vietnam. They generally do so by undertaking a study of the reasons for
America's entrance into Vietnam, their global policies at the time, their often-disturbing military
action in the nation, or numerous other areas of inquiry. However, such research nearly always
ignores the fact that there was a single event—a single political decision—that summed up how
and why everything went so wrong. That event was the Geneva conference. "To understand the
course and outcome of the Vietnam wars," wrote Mark A. Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall in the
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introduction to their compilation of analytical works titled The First Vietnam War: Colonial
Conflict and Cold War Crisis, "it is essential to appreciate the connections between politicalmilitary events within Vietnam and the geopolitical currents in the wider world that gave those
events meaning among the governments that possessed the power to influence Southeast Asia's
postwar order."6
The actual bulk of the conference took place in a series of plenary and private meetings
between May 8 and July 21, 1954, where each of the parties in attendance took turns at leading
the discussion.7 Depending on the nature and sensitivity of the material discussed at each
meeting, transcripts or "summarized…press briefings"8 were or were not made available at the
conclusion of each day. Information about the conference also made its way to the public
through the addresses of members of the American administration, such as President
Eisenhower's infamous "domino theory" interview on April 7, 1954 (during an earlier phase of
the conference) and John Foster Dulles' address to the American people on May 7.9
Over these thirty total sessions, delegations argued feverishly on the global controversies
they had set out to resolve as well as on numerous situational roadblocks. For example, a debate
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These parties included France, Cambodia, Laos, the United States, the United
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over whether or not the Viet Minh-led representatives from Cambodia and Laos should be
allowed to sit next to the standing Cambodian and Laotian government representatives began on
the first day of the conference and was not settled until June 18. Those involved in the
conference as well as public observers also criticized fundamental issues in the structure of the
conference including the "communication gap," which was eventually summarized in The
Pentagon Papers as follows:
Nine delegations seated at a roundtable to exchange views, about
every second day, obscured the fact that true bargaining was not
taking place. Proposals were, of course, tabled and debated; but
actual give-and-take was reserved for private discussions, usually
in the absence of the pro-Western Indochinese parties. Even then,
the Geneva talks on Indochina were hardly dominated by Big
Power cabais; political and ideological differences were so intense,
particularly between the American and Chinese representatives,
that diplomacy had to be conducted circuitously…Not until the
latter half of June did high-ranking French and Viet Minh
delegates meet face-to-face, did Viet Minh military officials confer
with Cambodian and Laotian representatives, and did French and
Chinese heads-of-delegation privately exchange views. Communist
and non-Communist Vietnamese, meanwhile, refused to talk to one
another until July.10
Despite the numerous and time-consuming deficiencies of the conference, however, significant
and effective debate was eventually accomplished nonetheless.
Each of the nine nations present brought different opinions on the subject and desires for
resolution to the table; however, the most influential countries by far were the United States,
France, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Over the two decades preceding the convention, these
four nations had been locked in an increasingly inflammatory waltz around one another over
control of either Vietnam's lands or its politics, a contention that “[pitted] imperialism against the
two principal competitors that gained traction by mid-century—communist-inspired
10
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revolutionary nationalism and U.S.-sponsored liberal internationalism.”11 Because these
countries played the most direct role in the situation of Vietnam at the time of the conference,
their desires, fears, and political motivations ended up having the most effect on its final
outcome.
Out of the four, France had been involved with Vietnam in some way or another for by
far the longest—so far, in fact, that their desires and positions at the conference are worth
summarizing. The French began their colonization of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos almost a
century before Geneva, but since the early 1940s, they had been forced to defend their leadership
against the expansionist Japanese, the threat of Allied intervention, and numerous attempts at
rebellion by the Vietnamese people. To make matters more complicated, French leadership was
also being contested in their own country, although the nation and its colonial holdings
(including Vietnam) were controlled by the Pro-Axis “Vichy” French at the time that the relevant
Indochinese conflict began.
The French quarreled near-continuously with Japan from 1940 until August 1945, when
the island nation was forced to surrender from WWII and pull their forces out of Indochina.
During those five years, however, the on-again, off-again fighting and political labyrinth that was
the Japanese-French relationship distressed and angered the people of Vietnam.12 It was after the
first Japanese military action that the Vietnamese decided to attempt real, widespread nationalist
revolt (although communist sympathizers also took part) for the first time; they were rewarded
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with equally widespread and savage executions by the ruling French. Although the rebellion was
small and quickly quelled, it deserved recognition because it signified the Vietnamese people
were more than willing to fight and die for their independence. As David G. Marr put it, colonial
French and Japanese efforts in the early 1940s represented "…[a] critical, sustained challenge to
the Vietnamese identity that…had at last become the apocalyptic nightmare of the
millions…Crisis intensified the fears and torment of almost every segment of the population,
lending more credence to radical social proposals."13 And "radical social proposals" were indeed
not far behind: It was during this period that Ho Chi Minh, a Leninist-Marxist and the founder of
the Indochina Communist Party (ICP), began to redirect and consolidate his political following
into a guerrilla force to be reckoned with that would later come to be known as the Viet Minh
Doc Lap Dong Minh, or more simply, the Viet Minh.
After the Japanese surrender, the French finally expected to enjoy uncontested control of
their Southeast Asian holdings. Shortly after the August stand-down, however, the Viet Minh
staged their first majorly successful insurgency in the form of the “August Revolution,” which
launched the two groups on a path of violence and border disputes that led straight to the French
invasion of Minh-controlled Haiphong, the beginning of the First Indochinese War. This was the
war that still raged as the nine delegations met in Geneva.14 Despite their opposition on the battle
field, however, the desires of the French, of Ho Chi Minh and his supporters, and of the
representatives of the imperial Vietnamese government did not differ much around the
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conference table. After so much struggle and strife over nearly a century of colonial presence in
Indochina, the French delegation and their primary representative Foreign Minister Georges
Bidault were desperate to put an end to the costly and destructive fighting in any way possible
but also wished to maintain a presence in Indochina. In the collective French mind, wrote
Lawrence and Logevall, "…political leaders and public opinion alike viewed the battle as the
final test of their country's ability to keep Indochina within the French empire."15 At the same
time, the Viet Minh delegation, led primarily by Pham Van Dong, desired the freedom from
colonial rule that they had originally rebelled for, but also recognized that they did not have the
resources to continue this attrition-like war for much longer. The state of Vietnam's delegation,
meanwhile, just wanted peace for its people and its country for the first time since the Japanese
had invaded.
The other major “power pair” of the Geneva conference—and really, of the world in the
decades following the end of WWII—was the United States and the Soviet Union. After the
U.S.'s success in 1945, they became a part of what Peter A. Poole called “[an] awkward but
sometimes splendid leadership as a world power.”16 Now responsible for nearly half of the
world's industrial production, the American government and its people enjoyed a period of
fervent economic growth and a high quality of living.17 But with their great power also came
great responsibility: if they were to be serious about lasting success and peace in the Pacific
Theatre, the American leaders had to determine once and for all whose leadership they supported
15
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in Indochina. As James M. Carter noted, “The question was how to oppose revolutionary
nationalism, appear progressive and committed to an end of colonialism, and win over the
support of and maintain some control over developments within the former colonial world"—and
this question was not one easily answered.18
The Soviet Union was also interested in political control of Southeast Asia. In the
decades following the end of WWII, and indeed at the 1954 conference, the USSR played the
role of direct opposition to the American dominance. As an outline of American military
objectives known as “NSC 68” submitted to President Truman in 1950 stated, "The defeat of
Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French empires have interacted with the
development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly
gravitated to these two centers."19 Stalin appraised the situation perhaps more ominously in a
1927 speech:
In course [sic] of further development of international revolution
there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist
center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism,
and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline
toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command
of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of
communism in entire world.20
Although these words were written over a decade before anyone had even heard of a "Cold War,"
they still accurately summarized how the global stage was being set in the 1940s and 1950s—
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like a chessboard with the United States on one side, the USSR on the other, and all the other
countries as little pieces in between. At Geneva, the dichotomy between communism and
nationalism was reflected in the relationship between the Soviet Union delegation (including
Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov) and the United States delegation (including Secretary
of State Walter Bedell Smith and Undersecretary John Foster Dulles.) The strength of this
division was reflected in the way the other seven nations eventually allied themselves with either
one or the other nation. China, Korea, and the Viet Minh (also known as the Democratic People's
Republic of Vietnam) ended up on the communist side led by the USSR while Cambodia, Laos,
the United Kingdom, and France sympathized with the capitalist agenda of the United States.
This was where the idea of Vietnam as a "microcosm" came into play—just as on the global
stage, the conflict in the Indochinese peninsula pitted the two political titans (along with their
allies) of the 1940s and 1950s against each other for control of part of the world.
As the nations began their private and public debates, each made their desires and
concerns clear, and the debate moved inexorably forward despite issues of communication and
seating. The two most important questions of the conference began to become apparent. The first
was more direct: which leadership would the powerful nations of the world choose to support in
Vietnam? The second was implied: would the conference result in a communist or “free”
leadership of the nation? What is important to remember about the Geneva conference and what
was ultimately reflected in the answers to these questions is that at no time was actual rationality,
reasoning, and logic applied to these questions in order to find an answer. Each country knew
exactly what they stood to personally gain from the situation, so instead, they decided they
would misrepresent their own position and manipulate the positions of others in order to achieve
their own desired outcome.

12
The first question addressed at the conference—that of leadership—was not a new issue.
Ever since the United States had entered the conflict in the Pacific Theatre, they had struggled
with the question of which nation they would support for leadership there when they ultimately
pulled their forces out. Early on in the Indochinese conflict, even before the U.S. became
involved in World War II, they made efforts to ally themselves with the Viet Minh bid for
leadership.21 The American wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, also
remained in known support of Ho Chi Minh and his forces for many years, although the United
States themselves never vocally allied with the movement.
However, it is important to recognize that the United States' early cooperation with Ho
Chi Minh and his forces did not signify their sanctioning of the communist ideology. Rather, the
relationship between the Americans and the Vietnam nationalists was one of necessity: all other
forces in Indochina were stubbornly pro-Axis, which at the time posed a much greater threat in
American eyes. As the 1940s progressed—as America entered the war, fought it, and ended it on
August 6, 1945—President Roosevelt (and later Truman and Eisenhower) struggled to find a
leadership for Vietnam that would be both successful and congruent with the U.S's ideals.
The United States' opinion on leadership in Southeast Asia was most radically changed
when the threat of communism became apparent to American leaders for the first time. This is
also where the second question of the conference—of communism versus capitalism or
otherwise "free" government—came into play, where the dichotomy mentioned above was
"born," and where the American terror of communism that would come to define its political
policy was created, thanks in major part due to a man named G.F. Kennan.
21
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During WWII, and in the months directly following its conclusion, the relationship
between the USSR and the U.S. was not yet an unfriendly one—in fact, it was anything but as
Soviet aid had played an enormous role in the Allies' European victory. In 1946, however, a
counselor at the Russian-U.S. Embassy in Moscow (Kennan) sent an article known as "The Long
Telegram" to the U.S. Treasury Department as an attempt to address their questions regarding the
Soviets' refusal to cooperate with new global organizations including the World Bank and the
IMF. His article, of course, (the essence of which was later published in the magazine Foreign
Affairs under the pseudonym Mr. X, which is perhaps how it is more infamously known) ended
up influencing much more than that.
The report contained a great deal of alarming language and information. For perhaps the
first time, but certainly the most dramatic time, the USSR (and the communism movement) was
presented to the United States as a clear and present threat rather than an ally. Kennan described
the propaganda of the Soviet Union, which emphasized “No permanent peaceful coexistence
[between capitalism and communism],” and discussed the Russian “deadly struggle for total
destruction of rival power.” He went on to caution the U.S. government against what he called
“internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state [sic]:
intensive military industrialization; maximum development of armed forces.”22 In general, he
concluded, the true intent of the Soviet Union was as follows:
...to undermine general political and strategic potential of major
Western Powers. [sic] Efforts will be made in such countries to
disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national
defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all
forms of disunity...We have here a political force committed
fanatically to the belief that...the internal harmony of our society
22
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be disrupted.23
Although “Mr. X” may not have been the first person to suggest this kind of idea to the United
States government, his suggestion certainly had the most effect. “The Long Telegram” and its
later-published version “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” painted a picture of the USSR as a
massive malevolent world power masquerading as a friend to lull the United States into a false
sense of security while its secret agents dismantled capitalism from the inside out. Naturally, the
articles inspired quite a bit of fear in the American leadership and were serious contributors to
the United States' Cold War mindset, described above and summarized more succinctly in this
paragraph from NSC 68:
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our
determination to maintain the essential elements of individual
freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our
determination to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to
fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the
Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the
protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other
our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."24
This is the mindset that the United States delegation carried with it to the Geneva conference
and considered when making the decisions that shaped the global history of the following two
decades. It was also the mindset that led the U.S., in 1950, to decide the leadership of the French
was more palatable to American interests than the Communist Viet Minh and, subsequently,
make their support of French colonial leadership known with an “initial financial outlay of $15
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million.”25 The colonial, once-pro-Axis leadership which had once seemed so ludicrous to the
United States was now infinitely preferable to one more day supporting any communist-backed
organization. The long path of American extremism—of poor decisions made because the
communist alternative was unthinkable—had begun and it would end with the most devastating
military loss in American history.
The conference therefore started with the Soviet-backed Viet Minh in direct opposition to
the U.S.-backed French, representing the global trend towards communism and the global trend
towards capitalism respectively in Vietnam's little microcosm. By the end of the conference,
however, the alliances would not be so clear. Although the accords were the result of days of
debate wherein all the nations voiced their respective opinions, the final copy was not agreeable
to all present. “The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference: On Restoring Peace in
Indochina” officially ended hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and “[permitted]...full
independence and sovereignty” in each of the Indochinese nations without written alliance to any
particular political movement. It split Vietnam into two “regrouping zones”, one governed by the
Viet Minh and one by the state of Vietnam's standing government (with former Prime Minister
Ngo Diem Dinh as president); these would later come to be known as North and South Vietnam,
although at the time the declaration noted that, “The essential purpose of the agreement relating
to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military
demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial
boundary.” Finally, the accords declared that “free general elections by secret ballot” would be
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held in July 1956, wherein “each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the
sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of [Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos.]”26
When the nine delegations in attendance were asked to consider these accords, they were
really being asked to consider all the events leading up to that day in 1954, all the political
positions of the countries, all the alliances to both communism and capitalism that they may or
may not have participated in, and their own desires in the situation. William Bedell Smith and
John Foster Dulles were forced to consider their newfound global standing and the work of Mr.
X, which had so dramatically reshaped their view of the Soviet Union who now stood in defiance
to everything they held dear. They were unsettled—even afraid—of what the Viet Minh had been
able to achieve against the French forces; they knew also that the decision they made in this little
sphere of influence would make a statement about their efforts against communism on a global
stage. As Logevall and Lawrence put it, "All over the globe, policymakers and media invested
the battle raging in remote jungles of northwestern Vietnam with enormous symbolic value.
Nothing less than Indochina's political destiny seemed to be at stake."27 Now the accords passed
at the conference were asking them to take their hands off the situation—to leave the political
future of Vietnam to free and fair ballots. But the Americans wanted—needed—an absolute
victory for capitalism and could not leave anything up to chance. They had already begun to
accept more extreme, formerly-unacceptable political choices out of fear for the spread of
communism; now, they accepted one more.
After almost fifteen years of involvement in Indochina and after days of debating with the
26
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standing world powers, the United States refused to sign the Geneva accords. In April 1975,
President Gerald Ford declared the U.S. retreat from Vietnam—the ultimate failure. But here, in
Geneva, Switzerland, twenty-one years earlier, the stage for failure was already set.
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